Reno Personal Injury Lawyer - Wrongful Death

Hepatitis Victims May Be Duped By Med Mal Insurance Industry

Steve Klearman — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 10:47:48 GMT

Nevadans, you were duped by the medical malpractice insurance industry when you voted for the KODIN Ballot Initiative a few years back.

Now those injured through the sheer negligence and stupidity of a group of Nevada doctors may find that they've limited their ability to collect compensation.

Consider, for instance, that damages for pain and suffering are now capped in Nevada at $350,000.00. Evidence of insurance payments can come into evidence. The statute of limitations is now reduced to a year in many situations. The list of penalties for victims goes on and on.

If you got Hepatitis or HIV as the result of medical negligence do you think that $350,000 (before attorneys fees and costs) was enough to compensate you?

Call your state representatives and let them know that KODIN is a mistake.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Steve Klearman

Ricin Found - Disease and Poison in Las Vegas(2)

Steve Klearman — Fri, 29 Feb 2008 07:10:07 GMT

First news of 40,000 exposed to Hepatitis in Vegas and now authorities are reporting discovering what appears to be Ricin in a hotel. What's up in Vegas? Reminds me of an art exhibit I recently saw (still on display at the Barrick Museum there) that depicts scenes of apocalypse and absurdity with Vegas as the backdrop.

Barrick Museum Exhibit

According to Yahoo News, Ricin is made from the waste left over from processing castor beans, and can be extremely lethal. As little as 500 micrograms, or about the size of the head of a pin, can kill a human, according to the CDC.

Yahoo Story on Ricin

I'll be back within a few hours with my update on the Hepatitis case and back later today with my blog about why that case illustrates what an unmitigated disaster tort reform's been for the citizens of Nevada.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Steve Klearman

Nevada Hepatitis Scare

Steve Klearman — Thu, 28 Feb 2008 19:19:35 GMT

You know, you might think that you could go the Center for Disease Control website and get some update on what certainly appears to be a full-blown health care crisis in Las Vegas (40,000! Exposed? That's a big number! And that's a preliminary number...).

But the CDC website, at least from my look around just now, is more about some form of static and slow thing. There may be something current somewhere on the site, but whatever it is doesn't jump out to the viewer. And they don't seem preoccupied with our potential Hep C epidemic right now, at least not site-wise.

And there's no analogous state site in Nevada to report on this sort of (seemingly) urgent issue. At least none easily found.

I'm sure some government entity somewhere may have some sort of information about this

In the meantime let's look to one of our great democratic institutions, the private press:

USA TODAY reports that:

The Las Vegas Sun has a statement from the company: On behalf of the Endoscopy Center of Southern Nevada, we want to express our deep concern about this incident to the many patients who have put their trust in us over the years. As always, our patients remain our primary responsibility and we have already corrected the situation.

http://blogs.usatoday.com/ondeadline/2008/02/health-departme.html

It's especially comforting that they've "already" corrected the situation. After only 40,000 potential errors! That's attention. That is diligence...

I'll blog tomorrow morning on how Nevada's recent ill-advised adoption of medical malpractice tort reform could prevent thousands from compensation for what appears to be not only negligence but abject stupidity.

The facts are still coming in; we'll reserve judgment as good Americans do.

But make no mistake: Nevada's adoption of the so-called KODIN (Keep Our Doctor's in Nevada) ballot initiative was a catastrophic mistake whose effects are just now being seen. Nevadans were convinced that they were taking a shot at the trial lawyers when all they were really doing was negating their own right to compensation in serious medical malpractice injury cases.

Come back tomorrow and let's talk about the value of tort reform when it comes to cases like Endoscopy Center of Southern Nevada.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Steve Klearman

Nevada Endoscopy Center Malpractice

Steve Klearman — Thu, 28 Feb 2008 14:52:50 GMT

As many as 40,000 infected with Hep C in what looks like a potential mass negligence case against an endoscopy center and possibly a products manufacturer.

Stay tuned to this blog and I will bring you extensive independently researched details on this developing case.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Steve Klearman

U.S. Supreme Court Rules on Medical Device Lawsuits

Steve Klearman — Fri, 22 Feb 2008 13:19:48 GMT

I reprint here a summary from the recent important decision in Riegel v. Medtronic. This comes directly from the People Over Profits Grassroots Action Center:

Riegel v. Medtronic

In this case, Charles Riegel received a balloon catheter made by Medtronic which subsequently ruptured due to overinflation. Riegel developed a heart block and underwent emergency surgery. The Riegels later brought claims against Medtronic in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. The court found that the Riegels claims were preempted under the Medical Device Act, and the Second Circuit Court affirmed the decision. In this opinion, the Supreme Court affirms.

Summary

â€¢ The Supreme Court holds that state law claims regarding medical devices are preempted under the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) where the device manufacturer complied with federal requirements.
â€¢ The Court notes that review of the MDA turns on the definition of "requirements" in the statute. The decision states: "Absent other indication, reference to a State's 'requirements' includes its common-law duties." Thus, the holding expands beyond conflicting State regulations and statutes, which Congress was addressing in the MDA.

Limits of the Decision

It appears that the Court tried to limit the decision in several ways.

â€¢ The opinion applies to medical devices only (not approved drugs) based on the preemption language included in the Medical Device Amendments.
â€¢ The Court draws a distinction between state law claims made regarding devices approved under substantial equivalent review requirements and Â§510(k) pre-market approval requirements.
â€¢ The Court discusses the extensive FDA review process for Class III medical devices only, rendering the application of the opinion to Class I and II devices uncertain.
â€¢ The Court expressly states that the decision does not apply to cases where the manufacturer did not comply with federal requirements.
â€¢ In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg's first footnote states that the "Court's holding does not reach an important issue outside the bounds of this case: the preemptive effect of Â§360k(a) where evidence of a medical device's defect comes to light only after the device receives premarket approval."

Attacks on the Civil Justice System

This decision makes several derogatory claims about the civil justice system:

â€¢ Justice Scalia claims that the "Dalkon Shield failure and its aftermath demonstrated the inability of the common law tort system to manage the risks associated with dangerous devices."
â€¢ The opinion claims that lay juries do not appreciate the benefits of medical devices. "A jury, on the other hand, sees only the cost of a more dangerous design, and is not concerned with its benefits; the patients who reaped those benefits are not represented in court."

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Steve Klearman

Hospitals More Dangerous After Dark

Steve Klearman — Tue, 19 Feb 2008 16:58:42 GMT

A new study that appears in the Journal of the American Medical Association concludes that the graveyard shift in hospitals is the most dangerous time for a patient to require a "code blue" for a stopped heart. Researchers found that among the late night cases studied, there were a higher portion of instances where patients were discovered with no heart electrical activity; that is, too late to deliver a lifesaving shock.

According to the Associated Press, "Everyone who works in a hospital is going to look at this and say, 'Are we doing everything we should be?'" said Dr. Charles Porter, a cardiologist at the University of Kansas Hospital in Kansas City, Kansas.

This sounds a bit disingenuous in my experience since nearly every doctor or nurse I've ever talked to is perfectly aware that care declines at night. Among other things, this is common sense.

In fact, and as some readers know, I've previously blogged on the subject of the danger of hospitals at night and on weekends. Doctors know this; nurses know this; even lawyers know this.

If you need hospitalization, try to need it on a weekday.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Steve Klearman

Nevada Equitable and Legal Claims at Trial

Steve Klearman — Fri, 15 Feb 2008 10:10:44 GMT

On December 27, 2007 the Nevada Supreme Court clarified in Awada v. Shuffle Master, Inc., 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 57, the manner in which a Nevada District Court may handle mixed claims for legal and equitable relief at trial and found as follows:

In this appeal, we consider the primary issue of whether a district court has the authority to bifurcate the legal and equitable claims presented in a single action, conduct a bench trial on an equitable claim, and then use the findings of fact and conclusions of law from that bench trial to dispose of the case. On this issue of first impression, we conclude that Nevada district courts have discretion to bifurcate legal and equitable claims in a single action and to first conduct a bench trial on an equitable claim. Furthermore, a district court that exercises such discretion may then use its findings of fact and conclusions of law as a basis for disposing of claims remaining in the case, so long as it does so in a manner consistent with Nevada law and our rules of civil procedure.

We also consider whether the district court abused its discretion by sua sponte disposing of the remaining claims in a summary judgment-like manner after conducting a bench trial on respondents' counterclaim for rescission. In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it first considered respondents' counterclaim for rescission and rescinded the parties' agreement. Based on its findings and conclusions, the district court properly disposed of all of appellants' contract-based claims against respondent Shuffle Master, Inc., because those claims could not stand absent a valid contract. However, the district court improperly granted summary judgment as to the claims against respondent Mark Yoseloff and appellants' remaining claims against Shuffle Master because those claims can survive absent a valid contract between the parties. Additionally, the district court erred in resolving those claims without satisfying the procedural requirements of NRCP 56.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment as to appellants' claims for breach of contract and contract-based claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; we reverse the district court's judgment as to appellants' claims for fraud, civil conspiracy, conversion, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference with contractual relations/prospective economic advantage and as to appellants' claims against Yoseloff; and we remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Steve Klearman

Update on Nevada Allstate Attorney Misconduct Case

Steve Klearman — Thu, 14 Feb 2008 10:00:57 GMT

In the ongoing squabble over Allstate defense attorney Phil Emerson's repeated misconduct in arguing cases at trial, the Nevada Supreme Court rendered its latest decision on January 17, 2008.

In its introduction to Lioce v. Cohen, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 1, the Court stated:

On December 28, 2006, this court issued an opinion in these consolidated appeals.[2] The defendants in each of the four underlying personal injury cases were represented by the same attorney, who gave substantially the same closing argument on behalf of his clients at each trial. Asserting that defense counsel's closing arguments constituted misconduct, the plaintiffs sought new trials, with varying success.

In that opinion, we revised the standards under which district courts are to evaluate requests for new trials based on attorney misconduct. Next, we reversed the denial of the motions for new trials in Lioce v. Cohen and Lang v. Knippenberg, and affirmed the grant of new trials in Castro v. Cabrera and Seasholtz v. Wheeler. Additionally, we determined that the defendants' attorney's closing arguments in Castro and Seasholtz amounted to misconduct, and we remanded those cases with instructions to the district courts to calculate and impose monetary sanctions on defense counsel and his clients.[3] Finally, we referred defense counsel to the State Bar of Nevada for disciplinary proceedings. This petition for rehearing followed. Having considered the petition, answers, amici curiae briefs, and the replies, we conclude that en banc rehearing is warranted in part under NRAP 40(c). We therefore grant the petition in part, vacate our prior opinion in this matter, and issue this opinion in its place. On rehearing, we reach substantially the same conclusion as in our prior opinion, but we decline to impose monetary sanctions on defense counsel and his clients.

Because defense counsel's closing arguments encouraged the jurors to look beyond the law and the relevant facts in deciding the cases before them, we agree that they amounted to misconduct. In determining whether the district courts properly decided that this misconduct warranted new trials or not, we take the opportunity to revise our attorney misconduct jurisprudence. New trial requests based on attorney misconduct must be evaluated differently depending upon whether counsel objected to the misconduct during trial. When a party successfully objects to the misconduct, the district court may grant a subsequent motion for a new trial if the moving party demonstrates that the misconduct's harmful effect could not be removed through any sustained objection and admonishment. With respect to unobjected-to misconduct, we conclude that the district court may grant a motion for a new trial only if the misconduct amounted to plain error, so that absent the misconduct, the verdict would have been different. When ruling on a motion for a new trial based on attorney misconduct, district courts must make express factual findings, applying the above standards.

In these consolidated appeals, we conclude that in Castro and Seasholtz, the district courts did not abuse their discretion by granting the plaintiffs' motions for a new trial, and therefore, we affirm the district courts' orders in those matters. In Lang and Lioce, however, we are unable to ascertain from the record whether the district courts abused their discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motions for a new trial. Accordingly, we vacate those orders and remand those two matters for a new decision on the new trial motions, based on the standards announced today. In addition, we refer defense counsel to the State Bar of Nevada.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Steve Klearman

Does Nevada Have Jurisdiction? Part III

Steve Klearman — Wed, 13 Feb 2008 09:52:25 GMT

This is the last part of my three-part series on the issue of whether Nevada has jurisdiction over a doctor who practices medicine over the Internet from a different state.

1. Many States Have Recognized The Propriety Of Exercising Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Doctors

Courts have found jurisdiction over nonresident doctors where they purposefully directed their actions at plaintiffs' states. For example, where doctors or hospitals have sought business from a state, courts have held jurisdiction over them to be proper in that state. See, e.g., Cubbage v. Merchant, 744 F.2d 665 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005, 105 S.Ct. 1359, 84 L.Ed.2d 380 (1985); Pijanowski v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 635 F.Supp. 1435 (E.D.Mich.1986); Lemke v. St. Margaret Hosp., 552 F.Supp. 833 (N.D.Ill.1982). Whether a party solicited the business interface in the first place is irrelevant, so long as defendant then directed its activities to the forum resident. Lanier v. American Bd. of Endodontics, 843 F.2d 901, 910 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926, 109 S.Ct. 310, 102 L.Ed.2d 329 (1988).

In Texas, specific jurisdiction is established if the defendant's alleged liability arises from or is related to its contacts within the forum. To establish specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident physician who treats an unsolicited Texas patient outside of Texas, the patient must show that the nonresident physician, by his actions, knowingly interjected himself into the patient's treatment in Texas. See Clark v. Noyes, 871 S.W.2d 508, 514-16 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994); see also Kennedy v. Freeman, 919 F.2d 126, 129 (10 th Cir.1990); Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287, 288-89 (9 th Cir.1972).

The rationale for this rule involves a balancing of the State's interest in the maintenance of the quality of medical care rendered to Texans with the need for Texas residents to have access to the best available medical care regardless of state lines. See Clark, 871 S.W.2d at 516.

In Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213 (5 th Cir.1990), a Texas patient visited a urologist in California, who enrolled the patient in an experimental drug treatment program. The patient then returned to Texas. The California doctor mailed the experimental drugs to the patient in Texas. The drugs injured the patient. See Id. at 215. The Fifth Circuit held that an allegation that the doctor was shipping the drugs to the patient was sufficient to create a prima facie case establishing personal jurisdiction in Texas over the California doctor. See Id. at 217.

In McGee v. Riekhof, 442 F.Supp. 1276 (D.Mont.1978), McGee, the plaintiff, traveled from Montana to Minnesota to obtain treatment from the defendant doctor for a detached retina. The plaintiff then returned to Montana. At the doctor's direction, the plaintiff kept the doctor updated on his condition. After a few weeks, the doctor told the plaintiff he could return to work. The plaintiff did so and suffered a retinal redetachment with a massive retinal tear of the right eye. See Id. at 1277. The plaintiff sued the doctor in Montana.

The Montana federal district court determined it had personal jurisdiction over the Minnesota doctor because the plaintiff was in Montana when the doctor committed the negligent act for which he was sued: advising the patient he could return to work. The court stated: "[b]ased upon the fact the medical service in this case amounts to a new diagnosis, and was rendered to plaintiff while he was in Montana, this court concludes that exercise of personal jurisdiction in this situation is not unreasonable, and comports with the tenets of due process." Id. at 1279. The court stated that "it would be fundamentally unfair to patients to permit doctors to telephonically render services and treatment in Montana, yet shield them from suit in Montana" (emphasis added). Id.

In Kennedy v. Freeman, 919 F.2d 126 (10 th Cir.1990), an Oklahoma patient had a lesion removed by her Oklahoma physician, who sent it to the Texas defendant, Freeman, for a special measurement. See Id. at 127. Freeman measured it and sent a report to the Oklahoma physician that the lesion measure 0.2 millimeters. In fact, the lesion measured 1.2 millimeters. Based on Freeman's incorrect measurement of the lesion, the plaintiff's Oklahoma physician determined no treatment or follow-up care was necessary. Four years later, the plaintiff learned that malignant melanoma had spread over her entire body. See Id. The Tenth Circuit noted that Freeman willingly accepted the sample from Oklahoma, signed a report purporting to establish the size of the lesion and sent it to Oklahoma, and he sent his bill to Oklahoma. Freeman knew the extreme significance of his work and that it would be the basis of the plaintiff's further treatment in Oklahoma. See Id. at 129. The Tenth Circuit ruled that "when a doctor purposefully directs her activities at the forum state, that state has a greater interest in deterring medical malpractice against its residents." Id.

An employee does not himself lack the requisite contact with a forum merely because he acts on behalf of a corporation. Nor does he lack the requisite contact because independent actions of the corporation contribute to events in the forum that give rise to the lawsuit. Courts can constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident individual, regardless of his status as an employee, if his actions are a contributing cause of lawsuit-related events that occur in the forum, and if he is reasonably aware that his actions may have an impact in the forum.

Doctors are independently licensed professionals; many are their own corporations. In an age when electronic communication is becoming ubiquitous, doctors will inevitably stretch the limits of their licenses and extend their services to those in other states. Doctors who provide services to nonresident patients may reasonably expect to be hailed into court in whatever jurisdiction they might commit malpractice.

V. CONCLUSION

Why should Nevada adhere to a blanket rule that will result in less protection for Nevada residents in our increasingly electronic age?

The application of the fiduciary shield rule often results in deviation from the law governing personal jurisdiction. In obtaining jurisdiction over a corporate agent, courts must pursue reasoned analysis under the minimum contacts standard rather than reaching easy but incorrect results under the fiduciary shield rule. Courts properly have great discretion in asserting jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction is entirely appropriate in this instance.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Steve Klearman

Does Nevada Have Jurisdiction? Part II

Steve Klearman — Fri, 18 Jan 2008 07:58:02 GMT

This is the second part of what will be a three-part blog. See yesterday's blog for the issue that the following argument addresses:

A. The Fiduciary Shield Doctrine Is Not Law In Nevada And Even If It Were It Would Not Preclude An Exercise Of Jurisdiction

The fiduciary shield doctrine, a flawed legal theory that has generated confusion and countless inconsistent exceptions, provides that acts performed by an individual in his capacity as a corporate officer may not form the predicate for the exercise of jurisdiction over him as an individual. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 901 (2d Cir. 1981). The primary rationale in support of this doctrine is that "it is unfair to force an individual to defend a suit brought against him personally in a forum with which his only relevant contacts are acts performed not for his own benefit but for the benefit of his employer." Id. at 902.

The purpose of the fiduciary shield doctrine is to protect individuals from unreasonable and unjust subjection to personal jurisdiction, not to protect them from liability. Merkel Assocs. v. Bellofram Corp., 437 F. Supp. 612, 618 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). Therefore, the issue that the fiduciary shield doctrine addresses is where a claim can be litigated, not whether a claim can be asserted. See The Fiduciary Shield Doctrine: Minimum Contacts in a Special Context, 65 B.U.L. Rev. 967 (1985).

Many legal commentaries assail the fiduciary shield doctrine as a product of misanalysis and mistake and advocate its total abandonment. Id. at 967.

Courts have sometimes stated that acts performed on behalf of a corporate employer cannot supply minimum contacts for the purpose of jurisdiction over the actor. See Personal Jurisdiction and the Corporate Employee: Minimum Contacts Meet the Fiduciary Shield, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 813 (1986), citing Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1981); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277, 1281 & n.8 (10th Cir. 1969); Allen v. Toshiba Corp., 599 F. Supp. 381, 384 (D.N.M. 1984); Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 Supp. 1322, 1347 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).

While this approach has been termed the "fiduciary shield rule," the label is misleading for three reasons. First, this approach is usually applied to corporate employees alone, who comprise only a limited subset of all fiduciaries recognized in law. Id., citing Grove Press, Inc. v. CIA, 483 F. Supp. 132, 135-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (fiduciary shield rule does not protect CIA agents from jurisdiction based on wrongful acts performed in their official capacity). See also Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Washington Potato Comm'n, 410 F. Supp. 171, 180-83 (D. Idaho 1975) (fiduciary shield rule does protect state potato commissioners). Second, this approach can operate in a variety of ways, not all of which actually shield an employee from jurisdiction that might otherwise exist. Third, and contrary to Petitioner's contention, the uncertain authority for this approach, and its random application, make it far less than a settled rule.

In fact, several U.S. Supreme Court opinions seem to reject outright the constitutional underpinnings of the rule.
In Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984), the Court upheld California's exercise of jurisdiction over a reporter who lived in Florida and who was employed by a Florida-based newspaper. The reporter had written an allegedly libelous article about a California resident, which the newspaper published and distributed in California. The Court said that the reporter's acts directed at California justified jurisdiction there. The Court also held that California had properly exercised jurisdiction over the newspaper's president, who had edited the article. In reaching these results, the Court stated that each defendant's contacts with the forum must be "assessed individually." The Court recognized that an employee is not subject to jurisdiction merely by virtue of the employer corporation's contacts with the forum. But it does not follow from this proposition, according to the Court, that an employee is never subject to jurisdiction when he acts in a corporate capacity. The Court did not mention the fiduciary shield rule by name, but held that defendants' "status as employees does not somehow insulate them from jurisdiction." Id.; See also Personal Jurisdiction and the Corporate Employee: Minimum Contacts Meet the Fiduciary Shield, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 813 (1986).

In the companion case of Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), the Court reversed a lower court decision that it did not have jurisdiction over a corporate publisher in a libel action. In a footnote, the Court discussed whether the individual owner and publisher of the magazine might also be subject to jurisdiction. The Court stated, "[i]n Calder v. Jones.... we today reject the suggestion that employees who act in their official capacity are somehow shielded from suit in their individual capacity. Id. at 781, n. 13; See also Personal Jurisdiction and the Corporate Employee: Minimum Contacts Meet the Fiduciary Shield, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 813 (1986)

Courts have frequently expressed dissatisfaction with the results of a blanket application of the fiduciary shield rule. Some courts have recognized that the fiduciary shield rule may represent an improper deviation from minimum contacts analysis. Others have stated that the fiduciary shield is an equitable doctrine that should be applied with discretion. Still other courts have articulated various explicit exceptions to the rule. See Personal Jurisdiction and the Corporate Employee: Minimum Contacts Meet the Fiduciary Shield, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 813, 823 (1986).

One thing that is clear is that the fiduciary shield doctrine is not the law of Nevada. Under Nevada law, the inquiry as to whether a state may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant entails a two-pronged analysis. First, a court must determine whether Nevada's long-arm statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction under the given set of facts. Second, the application of the long-arm statute to those facts must satisfy the constitutional demands of due process. If both requirements are met, then jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant exists.

In its Order denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the District Court held that Plaintiff must establish a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction and cited to Trump v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 109 Nev. 687, 694, 857 P .2d 740, 744-745 (1993). See Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, p.2.

The District Court further recognized that "[d]ue process requires 'minimum contacts' between the defendant and the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Order, p. 2;109 Nev. at 694. The defendant must have sufficient contact with the forum such that he or she could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Id. The defendant must purposefully avail herself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or of causing important consequences in that state. The cause of action must arise from the consequences in the forum state of the defendant's activities, and those activities, or the consequences thereof, must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. Id.

A state may exercise specific personal jurisdiction only where: (1) the defendant purposefully avails herself of the privilege of serving the market in the forum or of enjoying the protection of the laws of the forum, or where the defendant purposefully established contacts with the forum state, and (2) the cause of action arises from that purposeful contact with the forum or conduct targeting the forum. Id.

The guarantee of due process contained in the fourteenth amendment has been construed as limiting the jurisdiction of state courts to enter judgments affecting the rights or interests of nonresident defendants. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978). The parameters for such a constitutional exercise of jurisdiction have been set by the minimum contacts standard.

Originally posted at InjuryBoard by Steve Klearman